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With the benefit of hindsight, it is becoming clear that the simplistic storyline about the “opioid epidemic” was entirely false. The claim that doctors prescribed too many opioid pills and that OxyContin “drove” people to heroin was a fiction - profitable for lawyers and government, but a fiction nonetheless. A very capable policy analyst, Amy Bianco, now shows us how the insurance industry quietly dismantled expensive, comprehensive pain programs and pushed opioid pills as the only reimbursable pain management program.
A Tale of Two Graphs (and More); An Investigative History of America's Overdose Crisis by Amy Bianco got little notice when it was published back in May, probably due to its length. We now have a Cliffs Notes edition by Lynn Webster at The American Council of Science and Health which should provoke some serious thought:
https://www.acsh.org/news/2025/11/21/tale-two-graphs-why-four-phase-opioid-story-falls-apart-49835
https://paingame.substack.com/p/a-tale-of-two-graphs-and-more
A Tale of Two Graphs – Why the Four-Phase Opioid Story Falls Apart
By Lynn Webster, MD — November 21, 2025America’s overdose crisis isn’t the simple story we’ve been told for years. A new investigation reveals how two key graphs — one famous, one ignored — shift entirely the way we understand what happened, why deaths keep rising, and why current policies continue to fail. This op-ed explains why the familiar “four-phase opioid epidemic” narrative collapses under scrutiny.
For years, we’ve been told a simple story about the “opioid epidemic”: first, doctors prescribed too many pills, then reformulated OxyContin “drove” people to heroin, then fentanyl arrived, and now a wave of ultra-potent synthetics is killing “naïve” users in record numbers. Four neat phases, one neat villain: prescription opioids.
It’s a compelling narrative. It’s also deeply misleading.
A new multi-part investigation by journalist Amy Bianco at The PAIN GAME—“A Tale of Two Graphs (and More)” is, in my view, the clearest and most honest dismantling of that four-phase storyline that anyone has published to date.
Instead of starting with slogans or cherry-picked timelines, the author goes back to the graphs that shaped public policy: the classic CDC figure showing prescription opioid sales rising in lockstep with “prescription opioid deaths,” and the less famous but far more important Jalal/Burke graph showing that overall overdose deaths have risen on a smooth exponential curve since the late 1970s, across all drugs, long before OxyContin ever appeared.
Once you put those two graphs side by side, the four-phase myth starts to unravel.
What this series does differently
Most commentary treats “Phase One” as a morality play: greedy companies, gullible doctors, and passive patients whose prescriptions inevitably turned into addiction and death. This series refuses that caricature.
It shows how the modern pain movement began in oncology and AIDS care. This was a good-faith effort by clinicians who had seen opioids transform the lives of people in terrible pain, and who reasonably believed that carefully monitored use could help a wider group of patients. It traces how that model depended on time, expertise, and multidisciplinary care—psychology, physical therapy, and careful follow-up—not just a prescription pad.
Then it documents how the insurance industry quietly dismantled those comprehensive pain programs, reimbursing the cheapest elements and starving the rest. By 2015, the number of collaborative pain clinics in the U.S. had collapsed from roughly 1,000 to under 100 outside the VA. What survived in most communities was a 15-minute visit and a bottle of pills—not because physicians were lazy or corrupt, but because the system made everything else nearly impossible.
The piece also exposes something almost no one outside this world has seen: how overdose is coded and counted. “Prescription opioid deaths” on a CDC graph are usually multi-drug deaths where an opioid was present, not the proven cause. When a doctor is under investigation, the pressure on medical examiners to label a death as a “prescription overdose” can be intense—even when the patient had advanced heart disease, cancer, infection or, in one jaw-dropping example, died in a car crash.
Once you understand how messy the “opioid deaths” line really is, the simple Phase One story—“doctor prescribes → patient becomes addicted → patient overdoses”—looks much less like science and much more like a convenient political script.
Beyond four phases: waves, scams, and a rigged ecosystem
One of the most powerful sections comes from a methadone nurse in Maine who describes three overlapping waves of patients she saw between the late 1990s and early 2000s:
• long-time heroin users trying to stabilize
• abandoned chronic pain patients whose doctors cut them off
• young people getting hooked on diverted pills from medicine cabinets and the streetThose three waves alone blow up the idea that Phase One was mostly about “innocent patients turned into addicts by their prescriptions.” The reality was a tangled ecosystem where licit and illicit markets bled into each other, where diversion happened in countless small ways, and where the same pill could mean stability for one person and chaos for another.
The series goes further, tracing what it calls a “hierarchy of scams”: scammers who lied to doctors to get pills; law-enforcement strategies that turned those scammers into witnesses against high-volume prescribers; prosecutors who built careers by portraying pain specialists as kingpins; and insurers and government programs quietly saving money when those practices were shut down and complex patients scattered. All of this was then wrapped in the rhetoric of a new front in the War on Drugs: the “War on Prescription Drug Abuse.”
Meanwhile, as opioid prescriptions have fallen sharply since 2012, deaths from illicit fentanyl and its analogues have exploded. The second CDC graph of the article makes this brutally clear: prescribing plummets while the line of synthetic opioid deaths rockets upward. If pills were truly the singular engine of the crisis, those trends should move together. They don’t.
Why this matters now
If you live with pain, treat people in pain, or care about overdose policy, you already know something is off in the dominant story. Pain patients are being forcibly tapered or abruptly cut off. Clinicians are leaving the field in fear. Yet overdose deaths keep rising, driven by a volatile illicit market that our policies helped create.
Bianco’s series gives you the missing context and language to explain why.
It challenges the “magic molecule” theory which is the idea that a brief encounter with an opioid dooms a large share of people to lifelong addiction. If that were true, routine post-surgical prescribing over the last 50 years would have produced apocalyptic levels of opioid use disorder. It didn’t. The reality is far more nuanced, and far more tied to social conditions, trauma, and long-running failures of the War on Drugs than to any single product or prescription.
Most importantly, Bianco’s pieces insist on telling the story in all its messy, human detail: the patients who did everything “right” and were still treated as suspects; the young people who started using pills as teenagers because they were everywhere and life was hard; and the clinicians and law-enforcement officers who tried to do the right thing inside systems that rewarded spectacle over truth.
An invitation
If you’re tired of being told that the crisis can be explained in four tidy phases and one villain, I’d encourage you to read “A Tale of Two Graphs (and More)” and share it widely.
It doesn’t deny the harms of opioids or the responsibility of industry. It does something braver; it shows how partial truths, weaponized graphs, and a half-century of bad drug policy have combined to produce the catastrophe we’re in, and it explains why doubling down on the same narrative will only make things worse.
If we want policies that save lives and protect people in pain, we have to start by telling the story honestly. This series is a major step in that direction.
Lynn R. Webster, MD, is a pain and addiction medicine specialist and serves as Executive Vice President of Scientific Affairs at Dr. Vince Clinical Research, where he consults with pharmaceutical companies. He is also Senior Fellow, Center for U.S. Policy
Dr. Webster is the author of the forthcoming book, Deconstructing Toxic Narratives—Data, Disparities, and a New Path Forward in the Opioid Crisis, to be published by Springer Nature. He is not a member of any political or religious organization
Hung jury in Florida hospitals' opioid case against CVS, Walgreens, and Wal-Mart:
Florida hospitals' opioid case against Walmart, CVS, Walgreens results in mistrial
By Dietrich Knauth - December 8, 2025Dec 8 (Reuters) - A Florida judge on Monday declared a mistrial in a lawsuit that accused Walmart, CVS and Walgreens of flooding the state with opioids and raising costs for local hospitals.
The trial began in Broward County Circuit Court in September, and jurors deliberated for 14 days before telling the judge they could not reach a unanimous verdict.
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During the lengthy deliberations, one juror was dismissed from the case after a dispute with another juror. Broward County Chief Judge Carol-Lisa Philips had denied several of the pharmacy chains' motions for a mistrial on Monday morning before the remaining eight jurors told her for a second time that they could not reach agreement later that day.SURGE IN OPIOID USE
Sixteen Florida hospitals, including Broward Health, Tampa General Hospital and Good Samaritan Medical Center, sued in 2019, accusing the pharmacy chains of violating Florida's anti-racketeering law by working with drugmakers and distributors to drive up opioid sales. The hospitals say the surge in opioid use led to injuries they had to treat, often without being reimbursed.
Opioid addiction is an epidemic in the United States, and the health crisis has sparked thousands of lawsuits accusing drug companies of contributing to the problem by deceptively marketing opioid painkillers like Oxycontin as less addictive alternatives for pain treatment.
More than 800,000 people died from opioid overdoses between 1999 and 2023, according to statistics from the Centers for Disease Control. That number includes both prescription medicine and illegal drugs, like fentanyl, which have accounted for an increasing proportion of overdoses and injuries in recent years.
The hospitals claimed the companies conspired to profit from soaring opioid prescriptions despite being keenly aware of the addiction risks. Between 2006 and 2018, the pharmacies dispensed more than 21 billion opioid pills in 15 Florida counties served by the hospitals — nearly 200 pills a year for every resident, according to the complaint. The hospitals say they racked up $528.3 million in unpaid bills for treating opioid-related injuries, and another $1.5 billion when patients with opioid-related conditions sought care for other issues.
Plaintiffs' attorney Warren Burns said in closing arguments that Reuters viewed on Courtroom View Network that patients' opioid use complicated treatment and drove up costs even for patients admitted to the hospital for other reasons.
"Opioids have an impact on practically every system in your body," Burns said. "Even when you're coming in with a car accident, opioids can potentially complicate that care as well, because they can't treat your pain."
The pharmacy chains argued they sold legal medications prescribed by doctors and denied conspiring with drugmakers.
In his closing argument, Walmart attorney David Markus called the lawsuit “a money grab,” saying the hospitals’ damages calculations included cases where bills were fully paid and even instances where the hospitals’ own physicians prescribed opioids.
“There was no conspiracy,” Markus told jurors.
The hospitals initially sued a wide range of opioid manufacturers, distributors and pharmacies, but most other defendants reached nationwide settlements that resolved the hospitals' opioid claims. Companies that made or sold opioid medications have committed over $50 billion to settlements, including both the nationwide deals and separate agreements negotiated by individual states.
The case is Florida Health Sciences Center, North Broward Hospital District, et al. v. CVS, Walmart, and Walgreens; Seventeenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, No. 19-018882
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